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I.

Abstract
In the post-Second World War era, intra-state conflict has become an increasingly prominent

feature of the international system. Accompanying the increase in civil conflicts has been
interventions by third-parties seeking to influence the outcome of those civil conflicts. This has
had a decisive impact on the duration of civil conflict that this work seeks to analyze in detail.
Using duration of civil conflict as the dependent variable and intervention as the independent
variable, this work will seek to demonstrate empirically that intervention in civil conflict has a
significant impact on prolonging the duration of the conflict and can contribute to complicating
efforts to reach peace settlements ending civil conflict. This work seeks to achieve this by
analyzing the motives of states for intervening and how it contextualizes intervention and its
impact on duration and types of third-party interventions that impact duration. It will do this
through analyzing relevant scholarship regarding these topics and how they impact intervention
and duration of civil conflict.
II. Introduction
Civil conflicts have become an increasingly prevalent feature in the international system
since the conclusion of the Second World War. Along with this ubiquitous phenomenon has been
the increasing trend of intervention by third-parties in civil conflicts. In fact, in a study of civil
conflicts between 1816-1945, it was found that only twenty-two percent of civil wars
experienced third party interventions, compared to sixty-two percent since 1945 (Balch-Lindsay
and Enterline 2000). With this sharp increase in interventions, the duration of these civil conflicts
have been significantly impacted. This international development has dire ramifications not just
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because of the prolonged duration intervention can cause for civil conflicts. It also can enhance
the destruction and instability caused by prolonged duration of conflict in the civil war state.
Interventions themselves cannot be viewed as a monolithic act by states, as a variety of
interventions are practiced by states that have different impacts on the duration
of civil conflict (Regan 1998). As a result, it is important to analyze closely different types of
interventions and how motives behind them contextualize interventions’ influence on the
duration of civil conflict. The nature of the conflict itself experiencing intervention is also
important for determining an intervention’s impact on the duration of civil conflict. This is
because varying characteristics of civil conflict can determine intervention’s likelihood to reduce
or prolong the duration of conflict (Regan 1996). Therefore, this work seeks to argue that based
on scholarship and empirical data presented and analyzed in this work, intervention in civil
conflicts have a significant impact on prolonging the duration of them. An examination of
relevant scholarship will seek to demonstrate this.
III. Literature Review
As intervention in civil conflicts have become a more prominent trait of the contemporary
international system, scholars have presented a diverse array of arguments explaining why this is
the case and the impact this has had on the duration of civil wars. As Lawson (2019) argues that
both single-state and multi-state intervention prolong civil wars, understanding why states
choose to intervene is critical to gaining a complete understanding as to how interventions
prolong duration in civil conflicts. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) argue that in the Cold
War era, civil conflicts and their outcomes were integral to inter-state dynamics. This meant that
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they were tied to what Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) describe as a global security web,
where states have a national interest in the outcome of these civil conflicts causing them to
intervene. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) go further to argue this as the cause for prolonged
duration of civil conflicts because intervenors can prolong conflict in order to achieve outcomes
favorable to their national interests. Intervenors are able to do this because they often times
possess more military and economic capabilities that enable them to pressure belligerents to
continue fighting and block efforts to achieve peace settlements detrimental to the national
interest of the intervenor (Regan 1998). Oftentimes because outcomes of civil conflict are
intertwined within the international system, interventions by one power can attract counter
interventions by another. These become known as balancing interventions, where one power
intervenes in a civil conflict to negate the advantage the other intervenor wishes to gain in
influencing the outcome of civil conflict (Aydin and Regan 2011). More prevalent in the bipolar
system of the Cold War, Aydin and Regan (2011) argue that these balancing interventions
significantly prolong civil conflict. This is because competing interventions can fuel a stalemate
between both sides as their military capabilities are enhanced by aid from the intervenor,
reducing the power asymmetries typically seen in civil conflict. The benefits one side receives
from an intervention can also embolden them to fight for longer periods of time and be less
willing to make concessions necessary for an agreement (Aydin and Regan 2011). Efforts to
achieve peace also become more complicated as more actors are added in the peace process. This
creates more opportunity for disagreements and more parties to be placated in order to reach a
agreement making them less likely and prolonging civil conflict duration as a result
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(Cunningham 2006). Therefore interventions in civil conflicts are a signature feature of the
international system. This is because states often view them as tied to inter-state dynamics and
subsequently view intervention in civl conflicts as a means to advance or protect their
vital national interests. Aydin and Regan (2011) mention the civil wars in Angola, Afghanistan,
and Nicaragua in the 1970s and 1980s as good examples because competing interventions were
conducted to influence an outcome viewed favorable to both the United States and the Soviet
Unions’ national interests. This however is likely to prolong duration of civil conflict and
heighten the destruction caused by them for civil war states as it was seen in these three
countries.
In the post-Cold War era, humanitarian interventions in civil wars have become more
common. This is due to the rash of genocidal civil conflicts that have spawned humanitarian
disasters in recent decades. This has placed domestic pressures on states to intervene in civil
conflicts to prevent genocide and ease the humanitarian disasters such as famine caused by these
types of civil conflicts (Regan 1998). Despite the sincere motivations behind these interventions
however, they nonetheless often fail to reduce the duration of conflict and can even have a
counterproductive impact (Regan 2002). Regan (2002) argues that neutral interventions driven
by these humanitarian concerns often are unsuccessful. This is because the presence of a neutral
intervenor aimed at providing humanitarian relief fails to provide an incentive for the
belligerents to seek peace agreements or cease fighting. Oftentimes also these neutral
interventions are rarely perceived as such by belligerents, causing them to a view an interest in
continued fighting to achieve a military victory rather than seeking a negotiated settlement
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(Regan 2002). Regan (2002) presents the example of the United Nations 1992-1993 intervention
in Somalia to provide humanitarian relief in order to alleviate the impacts of famine brought by
the country’s civil war as demonstrating the shortcomings of these neutral interventions. This is
because the UN intervention not only failed to bring an end to the violence, but militia groups
began promptly targeting UN food distribution sites and peacekeepers sent to protect them. This
culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident where the death of U.S. Special Forces
soldiers led to the withdrawal of the UN force with the failure of bringing an end to the conflict
and mitigating the humanitarian disaster in the country. Thus the case of Somalia Regan (2002)
concludes is a striking example of how interventions albeit driven by sincere and idealistic
intentions nonetheless often fail to reduce the duration of civil conflict. This incident had a
lasting impact on decisions for humanitarian interventions in later civil conflicts. As Regan
(1998) states that intervenors in civil conflicts intervene only when they view the benefits of
intervention to exceed the costs, therefore intervenors must see a viable prospect for success in
their interventions. This is the primary reason why the international community shied away from
intervening in the 1994 Rwandan genocide a year later. This was because in the aftermath of
Somalia, the international community judged the costs of intervention to be high and viewed the
prospect of their intervention reducing the duration of conflict to be unlikely (Regan 1998).
Along with interventions intended to provide humanitarian relief, the promotion of
democratization has been a common feature of humanitarian based interventions in the post-Cold
War era. This was because with the conclusion of the Cold War, much of the international
community viewed the promotion of a liberal democratic world order as a humanitarian issue
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essential to promoting peace and human rights (Metternich 2011). Interventions in civil conflicts
with democratic mandates however can have as equally counterproductive impacts on the
duration of civil conflicts as humanitarian interventions. Metternich (2011) argues that
interventions in civil conflicts with the aim of promoting democratization often prolongs the
duration of civil conflict. This is because rebel groups fighting against the government in civil
wars often represent a disaffected minority. An intervention in a civil conflict with a democratic
mandate would embolden this rebel group to continue fighting. This is because as a minority,
democratization would threaten to lead to their exclusion, marginalization, and possible
domination by the majority identity group within a democratic system (Metternich 2011). As a
result of this Metternich (2011) further argues that these rebel groups therefore have a vested
interest and incentive in continuing to fight as they have much to lose from electoral politics. The
conditions for the government in civil conflict can be the same. This is because if a government
represents a minority identity group in power, they would be equally likely to resist interventions
with democratic mandates. This is because a democratic system would surely threaten the
privileges enjoyed by the minority group in power (Metternich 2011).Therefore interventions
with democratic mandates are likely to prolong civil conflict. This is because one group can have
much to lose from electoral politics and as a result has an incentive to continue fighting in order
to achieve a military victory. This has the effect of prolonging civil war duration and frustrating
efforts to achieve peace.
Regime types of states can play an important role in decisions behind intervention and its
impact on duration of civil conflict. This is because governments facing domestic problems and
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criticism may undertake diversionary interventions in civil conflicts (Pickering and Kisangani
2005). This is significant to analyze because certain regime types are more vulnerable to these
domestic pressures, making some regimes more likely than others to intervene in civil conflicts
(Pickering and Kisangani 2005). Pickering and Kisangani (2005) argue that regimes most
likely to intervene in civil conflicts are consolidating autocracies, autocratic regimes that are
in the process of establishing their hold on power. This is because consolidating autocracies
often do not have firm control over the socio-economic elites or military within the country,
an essential component to any authoritarian regime as they lack the popular legitimacy of the
people through electoral politics. Unlike consolidated authoritarian regimes, consolidating
authoritarian regimes also cannot rely on repression through the military and security forces to
suppress domestic dissent and criticism because their control over those institutions are tenuous
and not yet firmly established (Pickering and Kisangani 2005). Therefore these consolidating
autocratic regimes must distract domestic criticism by undertaking diversionary interventions to
galvanize the population behind them and create opportunities to accelerate the consolidation of
their regime by co-opting military and socio-economic elites in the country in a time of war. This
has the effect of prolonging civil conflict because these consolidating regimes have a political
incentive to prolong the conflict they have intervened in to accelerate their consolidation of
power (Pickering and Kisangani 2005). Understanding regime type and the role it plays in
intervention and duration of civil conflict are important because it generates an understanding of
which regime types are more likely to intervene. It is also important to recognize that these
interventions can be driven by political motivations, where an intervention prolonging the
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duration of civil conflict can have political benefits for the intervenor, particularly in the case of
consolidating autocracies as Pickering and Kisangani (2005) argue.
Having analyzed how the motivations of states for intervening in civil conflict impacts their
duration, it is equally important to understand the certain types of interventions that have varying
degrees of impact on duration. One is a biased single-state intervention in civil conflict to
support one side. Lawson (2019) has argued that single-state interventions prolong conflict
duration because it adds another actor to the civil war process. This actor can have an interest in
the outcome of the conflict different from the domestic belligerents participating. This can lead
the single-state intervenor to protract conflict in order to achieve an outcome more favorable to
them. They can also afford to protract the conflict longer because they are typically wealthier
than the other belligerents and are not enduring the same human and economic destruction of the
civil war state (Lawson 2019). This provides them with less of an incentive to reach a negotiated
settlement and therefore see an interest in continuing to prolong the conflict through their
intervention.
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline et. al (2008) contrasts this argument however by stating that
single-state interventions can reduce the duration of civil conflict. This is because single-state
interventions can enhance power asymmetries between belligerents in favor of the side
benefiting from intervention. This leads the intervention to tip the balance of power in favor of
the belligerent being supported, enabling them to achieve a military victory in a faster period and
reducing the duration of the civil conflict. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline et. al (2008) use the
examples of Bosnia and Kosovo in the the 1990s by arguing that the singular intervention of
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NATO on the side of both of those seceding regions of the former Yugoslavia were decisive to
reducing the duration of the conflict. This is because NATO’s successful effort to deter Russia
from supporting Serbia enabled NATO to engage in a one sided intervention in the form of a
strategic bombing campaign that halted the Serbian advance and significantly reduced the
duration of the conflict. Had Russia intervened on behalf of the Serbs, the conflict would likely
have deteriorated into a protracted stalemate with a significantly longer duration (Balch-Lindsay
and Enterline et. al 2008). Therefore scholarship regarding single-state interventions and duration
of conflict are mixed and contrasting. This work will seek to solve empirically this ambiguity of
single-state interventions and their impact on duration in the results and analysis section.
The impact of multi-state interventions on the duration of civil conflict are particularly
significant. This is because these kinds of interventions, typically more common in civil
conflicts, have a crucial role in prolonging their duration (Cunningham 2006). Lawson (2019)
mentions how multi-state interventions for opposing sides in civil wars can create protracted
stalemates. This enables both sides to continue fighting as power asymmetries are reduced
through economic and military support. Both sides are also emboldened by their newfound
support to continue fighting and reject opportunities for negotiated settlements, prolonging
conflict duration (Lawson 2019). Cunningham (2006) argues that the presence of multiple
intervenors have profound impacts for negotiating peace settlements that significantly prolong
conflict duration. The presence of multiple intervenors adds more parties to a potential peace
settlement. This creates more opportunity for disagreement amongst parties involved and more
parties to be placated in order to reach an agreement, complicating the peace process. Intervenors
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with divergent interests in the outcome can also act as veto players, where potential agreements
are blocked by one intervenor if deemed unfavorable to their national interest, prolonging the
duration of civil conflict as a result (Cunningham 2006). Cunningham (2006) further argues
that multiple intervenors can increase information asymmetries between belligerents. This results
from the increased complications of participation by more actors in the peace process. This leads
to an erosion of trust amongst belligerents that forms a significant barrier to reaching a
negotiated settlement and prolongs the duration of civil conflict as a result. This is because the
establishment of trust and the demonstration of genuine intentions is critical to reaching a
negotiated settlement. Those prerequisites for peace are frequently stifled by the presence of
multiple intervenors (Cunningham 2006).
Cunningham (2006) presents the Angolan Civil War (1975-2002) as a case study for how
multiple intervenors can retard the peace process and subsequently prolong the duration of civil
conflict. The presence of the intervenors the United States and South Africa supporting the
UNITA faction, and the Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea supporting the MPLA represented
considerable barriers to reaching a negotiated settlement. This was because these various parties
acted as veto players over each other, blocking potential agreements they deemed detrimental to
their interests in the outcome of the conflict and significantly prolonging it as a result. It was not
until these intervenors relinquished their support for these factions that a peace settlement was
much more likely (Cunningham 2006). The example of Angola presented by Cunningham (2006)
serves as a testament to the notion that multi-state interventions can significantly prolong
conflict, as efforts to achieve peace become exponentially more complicated as a wide array of

Zak 11
intervenors with divergent interests can block efforts to reach negotiated settlements. This can
significantly prolong the duration of civil conflict and the maximize the destruction experienced
by the civil war state as was seen in Angola.
The presence of multiple intervenors can also highlight how interventions can be driven by
ulterior motives. This is known as a independent agenda, where states intervene in civil wars not
with a specified interest in the outcome but merely to exploit the situation to intervene and
maximize their own power (Cunningham 2010). States can intervene in civil conflicts with this
independent agenda to seize natural resources, exploit the instability within the civil war state to
annex land, or intentionally protract conflict to destabilize and weaken a state rival if it is the
civil war state. This significantly prolongs civil conflict duration by increasing information
asymmetries as the true motives of these intervenors are often unknown, eroding trust and
creating more barriers to achieve peace and prolonging civil conflict duration (Cunningham
2010). The intervenor in this case has an interest in prolonging conflict, as they are benefiting
from the instability caused by civil conflict either economically or geo-politically. This can also
lead to shifting alliances, where intervenors support different factions that enable them to
continue benefiting from the civil war. This prolongs conflict duration as shifting alliances not
only complicate the peace process but also increases information asymmetries as allegiances
cannot be assured. This contributes significantly to complicating the peace process and
prolonging the duration of civil conflict (Cunningham 2010).
The Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC)
civil war during the 1990s presents a case study in how interventions with independent agendas
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can prolong civil conflict significantly (Cunningham 2010). This is because Rwanda and Uganda
sought to support different factions in the DRC in order to secure access to natural resources in
the country for their own benefit. They engaged in shifting alliances in order to achieve this by
initially supporting Laurent Kabila in his efforts to topple the DRC dictator Mobutu Sese Seko.
After Kabila succeeded however, the two states began supporting rebel groups challenging
Kabila because they believed he would threaten their exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources
(Cunningham 2010). This significantly prolonged the conflict in the country as Rwanda and
Uganda sought to protract the conflict and keep the DRC unstable in order to maintain their
access to the country’s natural resources. The case of the DRC highlights how states intervene
in civil conflicts oftentimes not with an interest in the outcome, but an interest in actively
prolonging the civil conflict in order to benefit (Cunningham 2010). Cunningham (2010) argues
these independent agenda driven interventions can be the most significant contributors to
prolonging civil conflict duration as the purpose of these interventions is the protraction of civil
conflict for economic or geo-political benefit.
Interventions with the purpose of diplomatic mediation represents a promising outlier for
reducing the duration of civil conflict (Regan and Aydin 2006). This is because interventions
aimed at mediation for a negotiated agreement can reduce information asymmetries significantly.
This is because third-party mediators provide an outlet for belligerents to be honest about their
threat capabilities and level of determination to fight. This serves to reduce the lack of trust
between both sides that stems from information asymmetries, making the achievement of an
agreement and reduction of duration of civil conflict more likely (Regan and Aydin 2006). Along
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with this ability to bridge the lack of trust between belligerents, Regan and Aydin (2006) argue
further that third-party mediators are also able to ensure compliance with any agreement reached.
This is important to reassuring belligerents in civil conflict that the benefits of peace exceed the
risks and therefore make them more likely to agree to a negotiated settlement. Third-parties
by ensuring all sides comply with an agreement can convince belligerents, initially hesitant
without the presence of a third-party, to endure the initial vulnerabilities and exposure to the
opposing side upon coming to a negotiated settlement (Regan and Aydin 2006). Regan (1996)
argues that the timing of diplomatic interventions can have an important impact on reducing
duration of civil conflict. Diplomatic interventions are more likely to be successful if conducted
in the middle stage of the conflict. This is because this is the most protracted and mutually
destructive stage of the conflict, making belligerents more likely to see a negotiated settlement as
in their interests to avoid continued fighting (Regan 1996). Therefore diplomatic interventions
aimed at mediation can be a promising silver lining amongst third-party interventions. Such
interventions can bridge the lack of trust between belligerents and ensure compliance to an
agreement as Regan and Aydin (2006) argue, making negotiated settlements more likely and
reducing the duration of civil conflict.
Biased interventions in support of the government generally have the impact of reducing the
duration of civil conflict (Regan 2002). This is because power asymmetries that are often
inherent in civil conflicts are more likely to be in favor of the government due to their capacity to
organize and apply greater resources. Therefore interventions to support the government enlarge
these power asymmetries even further in the government’s favor, enabling them to apply superior
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resources to overwhelm and defeat rebel groups which lead to shorter durations of civil conflict
(Regan 2002). Balch-Lindsay and Enterline et. al (2008) mentions how interventions in support
of the government in civil conflict can also alleviate pressures upon the government to extract
resources such as taxes from their population. This is because the government can rely on the
support from the intervention and are thus relieved of having to extract those resources. This
provides less opportunity for grievances to develop amongst a population from the stresses of
war but also allows the government to maximize its repressive capacity through benefiting from
an intervention to achieve a military victory and the subsequent shortening of the duration of
civil conflict (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline et. al 2008). Regan (1998) states how interventions
are more likely to occur in support of the government. This is because support for governments
often involve reaffirming principles of state sovereignty but also because these power
asymmetries typically favor the government. As a result of this, intervenors see potential gains to
be made from intervening on behalf of the government to influence the outcome (Regan 1998).
Therefore interventions on behalf of the government are associated with reducing the duration of
civil conflict as power asymmetries are increased further, enabling governments to achieve
military victories in shorter durations.
In contrast to interventions on behalf of the government, interventions for rebel groups can
significantly prolong the duration of civil conflict. Regan (2002) argues that rebel groups
receiving support from an intervention are less likely to agree to negotiated settlements. This is
because interventions stiffen the resolve of these rebel groups to fight and through their support
have the capacity to do so. This serves to reduce power asymmetries that typically favor
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governments, generating stalemates as a result that prolong civil conflict duration (Regan 2002).
Gent (2008) argues that military support for rebel groups through intervention makes conflict
ending in negotiated settlements more likely. This is because interventions for rebel groups
create protracted stalemates that prevents the government from militarily defeating the rebel
group challenging them. This prolongs civil conflict duration as a period of protracted stalemate
exists before belligerents recognize the futility of further fighting and agree to negotiations. The
process of reaching a negotiated settlement can also prolong civil conflict duration as the rebel
group is emboldened by their enhanced military capabilities and less likely to make the
concessions necessary for a negotiated settlement (Gent 2008).
Sawyer and Cunningham et. al (2015) argue that interventions by a third-party providing
financial support for rebel groups contributes the most to prolonging civil conflict duration. This
is because financial support enables rebel groups to endure the costs of war over significantly
longer periods of time. Financial support also allows rebel groups to train, buy armaments, and
build sustainable bases of popular support by providing goods and services to co-opt the
population. By doing this rebel groups can directly challenge the legitimacy of the state as an
alternative source for these services (Sawyer and Cunningham et. al 2015). This financial support
from an intervention on behalf of a rebel group can thus contribute greatly to prolonging civil
conflict duration as it provides rebel groups with the means to construct support infrastructures
that can sustain protracted conflict with minimal costs. Sawyer and Cunningham et. al (2015) use
the example of Hezbollah in Lebanon as a case study. Financial support from Iran and other Shia
fundamentalists have enabled them to operate for decades and co-opt the local Shia population
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through providing goods and services. This has allowed Hezbollah to sustain its struggle against
both the Lebanese government but also external foes such as Israel, as their financial support is a
large source of the immense power they have amassed since its founding in the 1980s (Sawyer
and Cunningham et. al 2015).Therefore interventions on behalf of rebel groups significantly
prolong civil conflicts as rebel groups are equipped with the arms and financial means to wage
protracted war with minimal costs. They are also emboldened by their newfound support and are
more likely to see a interest in continued fighting rather than seeking a negotiated settlement.
These factors combine to cause significantly longer durations of civil conflict as a result.
IV. Explanation and Hypothesis
Having analyzed the available literature previously discussed, it is apparent that third-party
interventions in civil conflict are likely to prolong duration. Using intervention as a central
explanatory independent variable therefore should be utilized in the empirical analysis. Duration
of civil conflict will be used as the dependent variable. Based on scholarly literature analyzed,
this work presents the hypothesis as follows. The presence of a third-party or parties intervening
in civil conflict are significantly more likely to prolong civil conflict duration.
The use of control variables in this empirical analysis is important to gaining a complete
understanding of the role intervention plays in prolonging civil conflict duration as this work
seeks to argue. The three control variables that will be included in the empirical analysis will
include secessionist conflicts, level of military personnel involved in the intervention, and regime
type of the civil war state.
These control variables are important to analyze to understand the type of interventions and
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characteristics of the civil conflict itself that impacts duration. The presence of secessionist
conflicts are important to analyze in order to discover if it results in interventions causing longer
durations. Regan (1996) argues that secessionist conflicts are likely to have longer durations in
general. This is because for the side of the government questions of territorial integrity are at
stake, causing governments to have a stiffened determination to fight on in order to achieve a
military victory and discourage other potential secessionist movements from emerging. Rebels in
secessionist conflicts are also determined to fight on as they often have entrenched grievances
that lead to the perception amongst a secessionist group that their grievances can only be
addressed in an independent state (Regan 1996). This contributes to longer durations of civil
conflict because each side has much to lose and as a result views an incentive to reject negotiated
settlements and continue fighting. Gent (2008) asserts that interventions in secessionist conflicts
are typically in favor of the rebel group. This prolongs conflict as intervention on behalf of rebel
groups prolongs conflict as power asymmetries favoring the government are reduced, leading to
protracted stalemates. The combination of secessionist aspirations and enhanced threat
capabilities from intervention enables secessionist groups to fight longer and prolonging civil
conflict duration as a result (Gent 2008). The empirical analysis controlling for secessionist
conflicts will examine empirically the relationship between intervention in secessionist conflicts
and duration.
The level of military personnel involved in an intervention is also a important control
variable. Through examining if more military personnel involved in an intervention can reduce
the duration of conflict, it can indicate to policymakers the need for overwhelming military force
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to be used in interventions for them to be successful and contributing to reduced duration. Regan
(1996) argues interventions by major powers can have a higher chance of reducing duration. This
is because these major powers have the capability to amass and apply greater military resources
to assist in shifting the balance to one side. Therefore Regan (1996) asserts the significance
of the relationship between large military interventions and reduced duration as large military
interventions can assist one side in achieving a military victory in a shorter period. Controlling
for military personnel involved therefore can provide empirical evidence for the role large
military interventions play in reducing or possibly prolonging civil conflict duration.
Analyzing regime type and the role it plays in intervention and duration of civil conflict is the
most intriguing of control variables used. Analyzing the empirical relationship between which
regime types are more likely to experience longer durations of civil conflict could become a
significant discovery. This is because little literature besides Pickering and Kisangani (2005)
exists regarding this factor. Pickering and Kisangani (2005) have argued that although
consolidating autocracies are the most likely regime type to intervene in civil conflicts,
scholarship has been largely devoid of content regarding if regime type of the civil war state has
a relationship with reduced or prolonged durations of conflict. As a result, examining the
empirical relationship between regime type and if it has an influence on intervention and
duration of civil conflict presents an opportunity to make a new discovery in the study of
intervention and civil conflict duration.
V. Research Design, Data, and Methods Section
The unit of analysis for this study included one-hundred and fourteen cases of civil conflicts
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from around the globe between 1946-2002. The cases were used from the Lacina (2006) data set
that included these one-hundred fourteen cases involved in the study. The independent variable
intervention was represented by the coding intervention and is measured through instances of
third-party intervention in civil conflicts. The dependent variable duration represents the time
duration of civil conflict and is coded in the Lacina (2006) dataset as duration. The control
variables used included level of military personnel coded as milper, secessionist conflicts coded
by secession, and democratic regime as coded by democ. Measuring the empirical relationship
between these variables included the running of a linear regression ordinary least squared model
that included milper, secession, and democ as control variables with intervention and duration as
the independent and dependent variables respectively. The linear regression ordinary least
squared analysis can be replicated fully through the coding of “reg lnduration intervention
secession milper democ” that produced the empirical results from the study (Lacina 2006).
Limitations with this dataset and measurement include the failure to distinguish between
certain types of intervention in civil conflict. This is significant as the arguments analyzed in the
literature review assert so emphatically that interventions cannot be thought of as monolithic, but
distinct acts to be analyzed on a case by case basis. The lack of this distinction makes it difficult
to measure with precision different types of third-party interventions in civil conflict and
demonstrate empirically if they have varying impacts on prolonging or reducing duration of civil
conflict. However, as intervention is measured in this study by third-party intervention in civil
conflicts, there is still opportunity to measure empirically the impact of intervention on duration
of civil conflict. This will allow the study to solve the contesting arguments between Balch-
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Lindsay and Enterline et.al (2008) and Lawson (2019) discussed in the literature review about
single-state interventions and their impact on duration as this study includes third-party
interventions in general. It will also empirically support or contradict the hypothesis of this work
that interventions in civil conflict do in fact significantly prolong civil conflict duration.
VI. Results and Analysis Section

Table 1: Intervention and Duration of Civil Conflicts, 1946-2002
Intervention

0.674***
(0.210)

Secessionist Conflict

0.268
(0.230)

Military Personnel

-0.00023*
(0.00014)

Democratic Regime

0.294
(0.274)

Constant

1.120
(0.189)

Observations

114

R-Squared
0.14
__________________________________________________________
*** if p<0.01; ** if p<0.05; * if p<0.1 standard error in parentheses
The table above presents the results from the Lacina (2006) data set involving a linear
regression ordinary least squared model analysis. This study found a statistically significant
relationship between intervention and duration of civil conflict. This significant relationship is
considerable because its coefficient was below 0.01, empirically indicating that intervention
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greatly prolongs civil conflict duration. This finding supports the hypotheses and central
argument of this work that states third-party or parties intervening in civil conflict are
significantly more likely to prolong civil conflict duration. This finding also solves the ambiguity
in scholarship over single-state interventions, as third-party interventions in general significantly
prolong conflict duration as the Lacina (2006) data set demonstrates. The relationship between
secessionist conflicts and duration of civil conflict was positive but insignificant. This means that
although secessionist conflicts can tend to last longer, the empirical relationship is not
convincing enough for it to be considered the standard explanation. Although the findings do
support Regan (1996) and his arguments that secessionist conflicts last longer, other
considerations could play a factor such as power asymmetries or types of intervention in
secessionist conflicts that Gent (2008) argues can have varying degrees of influence on duration
in secessionist conflicts.
Military personnel involved in interventions and duration has a negative relationship but
insignificant. This reaffirms Regan (1996) and his argument that higher levels of military
personnel involved in interventions into civil conflicts can contribute to reducing duration. The
relationship was statistically insignificant however, suggesting that other factors must be
considered such as a the type of intervention conducted or characteristics of the civil conflict
itself that influences military intervention and duration. The most intriguing discovery involved
regime type and specifically democratic regimes within a civil war state. The analysis found a
positive but statistically insignificant relationship between democratic regime and duration of
civil conflict. Democratic regimes and their higher likelihood of longer durations of civil conflict
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can be for a number of reasons. Democratic regimes typically involve more parties to be placated
in a pluralist political system. This as Cunningham (2006) stated creates more opportunity for
disagreement that can make it more difficult to reach negotiated settlements. Democratic
governments also lack the repressive capacity authoritarian regimes typically wield,
making it more difficult for them to defeat rebel groups challenging their authority. This acts as
empirical evidence that democratic regimes are more likely to experience longer durations of
civil conflict. This is a topic scholars of civil conflicts can study further in order to better
establish the impact of democratic regimes on longer durations of civil conflict.
Having analyzed the empirical relationship between intervention in civil conflict and its
impact on duration, it can be understood how these methods of measuring duration and its causes
can be applied to civil conflict today to assist policymakers. In the case of the Syrian Civil War
that has raged since 2011, interventions in that conflict and their impact on its duration are
relevant to empirical findings made in this work and concepts discussed in the literature review.
The intervention of multiple parties in Syria has significantly complicated and prolonged the
conflict as a number of different actors have divergent interests in the outcome. Russia, Iran, and
its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah are intervening in order to protect the Assad regime and maintain
their presence in the Arab crescent. This is an example of Balch-Lindsay and Enterline's (2000)
argument that civil conflicts are connected to the international system, causing intervention from
third-parties that view an interest in the outcome by protecting or advancing their national
interests. This has prolonged the conflict in Syria as the presence of multiple intervenors
supporting the Syrian government and the wide array of Syrian opposition groups, divided into
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secular and islamist factions, has complicated the conflict significantly as the various factions
have acted as veto players toward one another. This leads each side to block potential agreements
they view as detrimental to their divergent interests in the war’s outcome that Cunningham
(2006) argues is so significant to prolonging duration of civil conflict.
The recent intervention of Turkey to crush the Kurdish autonomous region in Syria has
further complicated and prolonged the conflict. Despite Turkish opposition to the Assad regime,
Ankara has shown no concrete intention of backing the rebel groups seeking to overthrow the
Syrian government. This acts as an independent agenda on behalf of Turkey as they are
intervening for their own self interest of crushing Kurdish hopes of achieving a state which it
perceives as a threat to its own territorial integrity with its large Kurdish minority. The
independent agenda Cunningham (2010) argues is so destructive is occurring in Syria because
Turkey is making no effort to put an end to the conflict through its intervention or overtly
support a particular side. Turkey has only complicated the conflict further by adding another
actor to the civil war process and another set of divergent national interests in the outcome that
will further prolong Syria’s suffering and complicate efforts to end it.
The inability of the international community to end the conflict has provided further evidence
of Balch-Lindsay and Enterline’s (2000) assertion that civil conflicts and their outcomes are
inextricably tied to geo-political competition. This is why frequent attempts by the UN to assist
in ending the conflict have been blocked by Russian vetoes on the security council, as they see
the Assad government as essential to maintaining a presence in the Middle East and supporting a
Soviet-era client state. These factors discussed in the literature review and empirical results from

Zak 24
the Lacina (2006) data set therefore can be applied to explain Syria’s devastating civil war and
how it is unlikely to end in the near future as long as multiple parties intervene with ulterior
motives in the outcome.
The civil war in Yemen is another example of how interventions in civil conflict prolong its
duration. Concepts discussed in the literature review and the empirical relationship between
intervention and duration of civil conflict are also highly relevant to this case. Since 2015, the
civil war in Yemen has raged since the Iranian backed Shia Houthti rebels deposed the Sunni and
Saudi Arabian backed government in Yemen. The gains made by the Houthi rebels has attracted
the intervention of Saudi Arabia to counter their gains in the conflict. This is another example of
how civil wars and their outcomes are linked to regional competition between states as BalchLindsay and Enterline (2000) assert. The Saudis view a Houthi triumph as incompatible with
Saudi interests as it would give Iran access to the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. It would also offer
Iran a base of operations within the Houthi state to project instability and conduct espionage into
the kingdom from its southern border. As a result, Saudi Arabia has intervened in the conflict to
support the deposed Sunni government and its supporters to protect its interests. Iran has
intervened on behalf of the Houthi rebels for precisely these reasons of advancing its national
interests through their Shia proxy and to threaten its chief regional rival Saudi Arabia. This has
led to what Aydin and Regan (2011) argues is a balancing intervention between Saudi Arabia and
Iran as each state has intervened to offset potential gains that could be made by one side. This
has led to a protracted stalemate in the conflict as each side is reinforced by military, diplomatic,
and financial support. The duration of the civil war in Yemen is likely to be prolonged
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significantly with the presence of these intervenors, as the threat capabilities of both sides are
enhanced and their determination stiffened to continue the fight rather than seek a negotiated
settlement. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran can also work to block potential agreements and continue
the fighting in order to reach an outcome in the conflict they view as satisfactory to their national
interests.
The financial support in particular the Iranians are giving the Houthis is significant to
prolonging the conflict. As Sawyer and Cunningham et. al (2015) mentions financial support for
this rebel group will enable it to build a network of support that can sustain a protracted struggle.
Their financial support could be used to train, buy armaments, and provide goods and
services that will build popular support to fuel an indefinite struggle. The case study of Yemen is
another example of how civil wars and their outcomes are tied to a global security web as BalchLindsay and Enterline (2000) have argued. The outcome of Yemen’s civil war is viewed as
essential to protecting and advancing the national interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran. As a result,
a balancing intervention has occurred in Yemen, creating a stalemate between the belligerents
that will prolong the conflict and has already resulted in a series of humanitarian disasters such
as famine and a cholera outbreak in the country.
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, the empirical results found along with the diverse array of scholarship
analyzed supports the hypothesis of this work that intervention in civil conflict is likely to
significantly prolong duration. These findings are relevant to the present as the case studies of
Syria and Yemen analyzed in the previous section have shown how interventions in those
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conflicts have contributed to longer durations. Further appreciation and study of this topic is
important for policymakers as civil conflicts are likely to remain a prominent feature of the
international system. The persistence of weak states existing in the international system is likely
to create more opportunities for civil conflicts to break out as rebel groups will be tempted to
emerge and challenge the authority of the state. This possibility will be coupled with the
progression of climate change over the course of the twenty-first century. This will create more
opportunities for civil conflict as groups within states will be forced to compete over increasingly
scarce domestic resources. This poses a unique problem for heterogenous states as this
competition is likely to fall along ethno-religious lines, creating more opportunities for
horizontal inequalities to emerge and subsequent civil conflict. Such outbreaks of civil conflict
will continue to attract third-party intervenors hoping to influence an outcome favorable to them
or to profit from the instability through an independent agenda. This is likely because civil
conflicts and their outcomes will remain tied to geo-political competition, causing potential
intervenors to view an interest in influencing the outcome. These destructive acts however are
likely to prolong the duration of those conflicts and intensify the suffering and devastation of
those within the civil war state.
Diplomatic interventions advocated by Regan and Aydin (2006) remain a hopeful outlier for
interventions reducing duration of conflict. This is because states intervening with the genuine
intention of ending conflict can bridge the lack of trust between belligerents and ensure
compliance with an agreement, making them more likely. Therefore further study of the risks
interventions pose for prolonging conflict and complicating efforts to end them is an important
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part of gaining a more complete understanding of international relations.
The discoveries of this work regarding longer durations of civil conflict for democracies is a
finding scholars must examine further. Through producing more scholarship on this topic the
political science community can better understand the empirical relationship between
democracies and longer durations. It can also assist scholars in examining if this has any
correlation with the global decline of democratic regimes in recent decades. This could be
connected as weak states vulnerable to civil conflict may view authoritarianism as a means to
enhance their repressive capacity to deter potential challenges to their authority, rather than
investing in the institutions necessary to sustain a strong and healthy democratic regime.
Civil conflicts and interventions in them are an inherent reality of the international system.
The greatest tragedy of their occurrence however is not the longer periods of conflict and
devastation for the civil war state however, it is that third-party intervenors rob those in civil war
states of the right to determine their own futures. Foreign interventions in civil conflicts enable
those intervenors to determine the future of a civil war state for their own benefit, rarely
coinciding with the interests of the state falling victim to intervention. Therefore policy makers
must work to mitigate the destructive impacts of third-party interventions and hold those
accountable seeking to exploit and prolong the violence for their own sinister benefit. Through
doing this both states and the international community as a whole can lessen the long term
destruction and instability caused by intervention in civil conflicts.
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